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This paper provides a rationale for a …rm to adopt either an integrated or a sep-
arated divisional structure, which is based on the interplay between the structure of
authority and the costs and bene…ts of integration vis-à-vis separation. We use the
framework of Aghion and Tirole (1997) to explain the structure of authority. This
framework captures the notion of managerial initiatives. It shows that monitoring
by the head-o¢ce decreases divisional managers’ e¤ort levels. We incorporate this
framework into the analysis of costs and bene…ts of integrating or separating divisions.
Integration will be bene…cial for the head-o¢ce if it generates synergy gains. The
larger the synergy gains are, the more appealing integration will be. Consequently,
the head-o¢ce’s incentive to monitor increases. Due to a more intense monitoring,
managers exert lower e¤ort levels. For managers, integration entails costs and ben-
e…ts. If the bene…ts outweigh the costs, managers will be motivated to exert high
e¤ort levels in an integrated divisional structure. The optimality of integrating or
separating divisions will then be determined by the trade-o¤ between synergy gains
and the managerial e¤ort elicitation.
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11 Introduction
Firms often reorganize internally in an attempt to create a better functioning of their
internal structure. They may decide to integrate divisions under a common manager or to
separate divisions and to assign a manager to run each division.1 Consider, for example,
the recent experience of Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc. and Motorola Inc. (Wall Street
Journal Europe, 1998). The former decided to integrate its two movie-making subsidiaries,
TriStar Pictures and Columbia Pictures, while the latter decided to split its Consumer and
Infrastructure Lines.
In some cases such an attempt may work well, but in some others it may instead create
ine¢ciency, as is the case with Andersen Worldwide (Financial Times, 1997).2 This raises
the issue of identifying signi…cant factors behind the success and failure of an internal-
reorganization attempt. Business analysts often argue that the existence of synergy bene…ts
is the key factor.3 It certainly makes sense. However, there is a danger of over-emphasizing
the role of synergy bene…ts. We might tend to overlook the costs of integrating (separating)
divisions. If we take Andersen Worldwide case as an example, it is hard to believe that the
ine¢ciency is caused by the lack of synergy gains, given that both Andersen Consulting
and Arthur Andersen engage in complementary activities. In principle, having them under
the same roof should be bene…cial for the parent company. The fact that it is not indicates
that integration also entails costs. What are these costs? Will these costs be compensated
by the bene…ts? These are the questions that should be answered if we want to understand
better the reason behind the success or failure of an internal-reorganization attempt. Our
paper aims to do this.
In the literature, there are some theoretical studies investigating the costs and bene…ts
of integration vis-à-vis separation. Grossman and Hart (1986) argue that integration is
bene…cial as it solves the hold-up problem. It should be noted, however, that Grossman
and Hart’s paper stresses more on the external boundaries of the …rm. Their framework
1Internal reorganization may also cover other activities such as expanding (shortening) the hierarchy,
changing internal labor policies, changing the design of compensation, etc. However, in this paper we
restrict our attention only to …rms’ decision to choose a divisional structure, i.e. integrated or separated
divisional structure.
2There are two divisions under the umbrella of Andersen Worldwide, namely Andersen Consulting
(the strategic consulting division) and Arthur Andersen (the accounting division). The corporation was
established in 1913, and it initially operated as an accounting …rm. Only later that the consulting business
was added. Recently, it is reported that there is a con‡ict between Andersen Consulting and Arthur
Andersen (see Financial Times (June, 1997) and the Wall Street Journal Europe (September, 1997)).
Andersen Consulting has …led a request with an international arbitrator to break away from Andersen
Worldwide.
3See for instance Wall Street Journal Europe (June 1999), which reports that Telefonica SA, a Spanish
telecom giant planned to integrate its media units under one roof. Business analysts praised the move, for
they argue that it will enable the parent company to generate synergy gains.
2explains when a …rm should stay independent and when it should be integrated with an-
other …rm. Our paper, instead, focuses on the internal boundaries of the …rm. We analyze
the optimality of integrating or separating internal divisions. Consequently, Grossman and
Hart’s framework cannot be directly applied to our paper. There is essentially a major
di¤erence between the analysis of external and internal boundaries of the …rm that hinders
such a direct application, namely the structure of authority, i.e. who can decide on what.
In an internal organization framework such as ours, the head-o¢ce can always mandate
that divisional integration and interdivisional transaction be carried-out. A division may
not have the right to refuse the decision of the head-o¢ce. On the contrary, in Grossman
and Hart’s framework a …rm (’division’) can always refuse to deal whenever an unfore-
seen contingency that is not governed by the contract occurs, and can always freely decide
whether or not to integrate.
Riordan (1990) and Olsen (1996) also analyze the costs and bene…ts of integration.
Similar to Grossman and Hart (1986), their paper focuses on the external boundaries of the
…rm. Riordan (1990) analyzes the decision of a downstream …rm to integrate backwardly
with an upstream …rm. Such integration enables the downstream …rm to obtain better
information about the upstream …rm. However, it also comes with costs. It lowers ex-ante
managerial incentives. Olsen (1996) argues that integration brings complementary gains,
however it also creates greater informational rents for managers. Managers will tend to
push for integration, eventhough it might not necessarily be good for …rms. Obviously,
Riordan (1990) and Olsen (1996) argue that an integration attempt should be carried-out
whenever the bene…ts outweigh the costs. Their papers also face the same limitation as
Grossman and Hart’s paper. In their paper, a …rm has the right to refuse integration. On
the contrary, in our framework a division has no authority to refuse a mandated integration
by the head-o¢ce.
In contrast to the previously mentioned papers, Holmstr½ om and Tirole (1991) present
a framework for evaluating the costs and bene…ts of integration that combines both the
analysis of external and internal boundaries of the …rm. They consider a downstream …rm
that needs to obtain an intermediate good. The principal of the …rmmay decide tointegrate
the …rm with an external upstream …rm, or to rely on the external market to supply the
good. They assume that if integration is chosen, there will be a common owner. This
owner will delegate all control rights to the head-o¢ce. The head-o¢ce will have to decide
on the type of delegated-authority that should be given to divisional managers. There
are three possibilities. The head-o¢ce may fully delegate authority over trading decisions
to managers. Thus, managers are allowed to trade externally if they cannot agree on the
internal transfer price. The head-o¢ce may also mandate internal trade between units, but
still allows managers to freely negotiate the internal transfer price. Finally, the head o¢ce
3may instead be very strict, in the sense that the head-o¢ce mandates trade to be internal
and also determines the internal transfer price. This case corresponds to full centralization
of authority. Thus, Holmstr½ om and Tirole (1991) analyze two types of decision. The …rst
one is the decision on whether or not to integrate, and the second one is the decision on
whether or not to delegate authority over trading decisions to unit managers. The former
is an external boundaries of the …rm analysis, while the latter is an internal boundaries of
the …rm analysis.
Holmstr½ om and Tirole (1991) show that integration allows better coordination across
divisions. However, if integration occurs, the head-o¢ce may be tempted to mandate trade
to be internal. This may create ine¢ciency when external trade gives a better deal than
internal trade. The trade-o¤ between this ine¢ciency and the bene…ts of better coordination
will determine the optimality of integration.
Although Holmstr½ om and Tirole’s paper analyzes …rms’ internal organization, it focuses
only on the issue of delegation of authority to unit managers, but not on the issue of the
design of divisional structure. In their integration case, it is not clear how the result
will change when both, the upstream unit and the downstream unit, are integrated under
a common manager, as compared to when both units are separated and each of them is
managed by a manager. In contrast, our paper focuses on the design of divisional structure.
In the paper, we provide a rationalé for a …rm to adopt either an integrated or a separated
divisional structure.
As in Holmstr½ om and Tirole’s paper, we also explicitly analyze the structure of deci-
sion making authority in …rms. However, we use a di¤erent concept of authority, which is
borrowed from Aghion and Tirole (1997). We de…ne authority as the right to select actions
a¤ecting part or the whole of a …rm. It can be distinguished into formal and real author-
ity. The head-o¢ce has formal authority over the choice of projects to be implemented.
However, the head-o¢ce is willing to delegate the decision making authority to divisional
managers whenever divisional managers are better informed about the projects’ prospects.
In this case divisional managers have real authority. In contrast, Holmstr½ om and Tirole’s
paper does not make such a distinction. Their paper considers only formal authority. For
example, in their full centralization setting, the head-o¢ce has formal authority and knows
with certainty the best decision to follow. Thus, in this example formal and real authority
reside in the hand of the head-o¢ce. In reality, it is often the case that although the
head-o¢ce has formal authority, unit managers may be better informed. The head-o¢ce
may then prefer to let divisional managers decide.
The framework of Aghion and Tirole (1997) is interesting, as it captures the notion
of managerial initiatives. This can be explained as follows. Suppose that the head-o¢ce
wants a divisional manager to implement a project that is chosen from a set of available
4projects. To know which project should be implemented, the head-o¢ce and the manager
will have to exert e¤ort in the information acquisition. As a result, they will get informed
about this project with some probabilities. Assume that their preference on the project
to be implemented di¤ers. If the head-o¢ce is informed about her preferred project, she
can always ask the manager to implement this project.4 The manager cannot refuse it,
because he has no formal authority. However, if the head-o¢ce is not informed but the
manager is informed, the head-o¢ce may delegate the right to choose the project to the
manager. The head-o¢ce will not overrule the manager’s project choice. In this kind of
setting, higher monitoring e¤ort of the head-o¢ce will imply a higher probability that the
manager’s project choice will be overruled by the head-o¢ce. This lowers the manager’s
incentive to take initiatives.
Our present paper intends to incorporate Aghion and Tirole’s framework into the analy-
sis of costs and bene…ts of divisional integration vis-à-vis divisional separation. We assume
that the decision to integrate or to separate divisions rests in the hand of the head-o¢ce.
If integration is adopted, the head-o¢ce will appoint a common manager to run the inte-
grated divisions. If, instead, separation is chosen, the head-o¢ce will assign a manager to
run each division.
Integration will be bene…cial for the head-o¢ce if it generates complementary (synergy)
gains. Consequently, the larger these gains are, the more attractive integration for the
head-o¢ce will be. For the appointed manager, integration entails costs and bene…ts.
In an integrated structure, the manager will have to allocate e¤ort on each division. If
the e¤ort that is exerted on divisions are substitutes in the costs of e¤ort function, i.e.
the marginal costs of e¤ort exerted on a division is increasing in the e¤ort exerted on
another division, then having an integrated structure is costly for the appointed manager.
However, integration enables the appointed manager to obtain higher rents, i.e. private
bene…ts of control. Hence, the manager faces a trade-o¤ between costs and bene…ts of
integration. If the bene…ts exceed the costs, the manager will be motivated to exert high
e¤ort on divisions. The higher the complementary gains are, the higher the incentive of
the head-o¢ce to monitor will be. This increases the probability that the manager will be
overruled by the head-o¢ce. As a result, the manager will then be less motivated to exert
e¤ort. The overall impact on the managerial e¤ort is ambiguous. There may or may not
be an adverse e¤ect of integration on the managerial e¤ort.
The head-o¢ce might still prefer to integrate divisions, eventhough integration leads
to an adverse e¤ect on the managerial e¤ort, if the bene…ts of synergy gains outweigh
this adverse e¤ect. However, if the adverse e¤ect exceeds the bene…ts of synergy gains
then the head-o¢ce prefers to separate divisions. This is an interesting result, as it tells
4Throughout this paper, we assume that the head-o¢ce is female and divisional managers are male.
5that integration is not always warranted eventhough it generates synergy gains. It also
shows that the decision to separate divisions acts as a commitment device. By separating
complementary divisions, and thus foregoing the bene…ts of integration, the head-o¢ce can
commit not to harshly monitor divisional managers. Managers will then be motivated to
work hard. We also have a mirror case of the above story. It may also be the case that
integration is preferable eventhough it does not bring synergy gains, as long as the positive
e¤ect on the managerial e¤ort compensates the negative synergy gains. Here, the decision
of integrating non-complementary divisions also acts as a commitment device to elicit the
managerial e¤ort.
To sum-up, our paper thus shows that the optimality of integrating or separating di-
visions is determined by the trade-o¤ between synergy gains and the managerial e¤ort
inducement. In addition, we obtain other interesting auxilliary results. We show that if
the head-o¢ce prefers to integrate divisions, then she will appoint a manager whose inter-
ests are the most congruent with hers to manage the integrated divisions. We also show
that integration will become more attractive when divisions are more asymmetric in terms
of their degree of interests congruence with the head-o¢ce. This last result prevails un-
der the assumption that the head-o¢ce uses an information acquisition technology that is
inferior than the one used by divisional managers. We will show that such a technology
enables a manager with a low degree of interest congruence to take advantage from man-
agers with a high degree of interest congruence. Integration solves this free-riding problem.
Consequently, the more asymmetric divisions are, the more attractive integration will be.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the
model. In section 3, we solve the model for the optimal e¤ort of the head-o¢ce and
divisional managers. Then, in section 4 we compare the optimal managerial e¤ort in
di¤erent internal organization forms. In section 5, we compare the utilities obtained by
the head-o¢ce in di¤erent internal organization forms. In section 6, we discuss the choice
of a …rm’s internal organization. In section 7, we discuss an extension of the model to the
case of separable monitoring costs of the head-o¢ce. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model is based on Aghion and Tirole’s model (1997). We consider a …rm consisting of
a head-o¢ce, two divisions (D1 and D2); and two managers (M1 and M2). The head-o¢ce
will have to decide on how to structure the divisions. There are two options available to
the head-o¢ce (see Figure 1). The head-o¢ce can separate the two divisions and assigns a
manager to each division. We call the resulting structure as a separated form. Alternatively,
the head-o¢ce can merge the two divisions and assigns a common manager to manage both
6divisions. We call the resulting structure as an integrated form.
Figure 1: Divisional Forms
Divisions may be interdependent. We interpret this interdependence as payo¤ externalities
across divisions. We assume that these externalities can only be realized when there is
coordination across divisions. Divisional coordination can be created by integrating the
two divisions under a common manager.
Each division can undertake a project from n > 3 potential projects. We assume that
there is no project overlap between the two divisions. Thus, each division has a di¤erent
project portfolio, denoted respectively by i 2 fi1;i2;i3;:::;ing and j 2 fj1;j2;j3;:::;jng. We
adopt an incomplete contracting approach, and thus assume that the nature of the projects
cannot be described ex-ante. Hence, they are not ex-ante contractible. The payo¤s can
only be veri…ed ex-post of their realization. The head-o¢ce and divisional managers must
acquire information to know which projects among n potential projects give non negative
pro…ts and private bene…ts. Divisional managers and the head-o¢ce must exert e¤ort,
respectively e1, e2; and E, to acquire information. In an integrated form, in which there
is only a manager, e1 and e2 will denote e¤ort levels exerted by the appointed manager on
the two divisions.
In a separated form of internal organization, the two divisional managers will learn the
payo¤s of all possible projects with probabilities e1 and e2. With probabilities (1 ¡ e1)
and (1 ¡ e2) they learn nothing. Acquiring information is a costly activity. Divisional





In an integrated form of internal organization, e1 and e2 indicate the probabilities that
the appointed manager is informed about the payo¤s of the two divisions under his control.
Hence, (1 ¡ e1) and (1 ¡ e2) denote the probabilities that the appointed manager learns
nothing. In this internal organization form, costs of e¤ort are interdependent. The total




2 + ±e1e2: Parameter ± represents
7the degree of costs interdependency. We impose the following assumption on the value of
parameter ±:
Assumption 1: 0 6 ± 6 1:
Thus, we assume that e¤ort levels are substitutes. Only when ± = 0; e¤ort levels are
independent: If we have ± > 0; then increasing managerial e¤ort on the …rst division in-
creases marginal costs of managerial e¤ort on the second division. We have a perfect
substitute when ± = 1: This cost-substitutability exists because of, for instance, limited
ability of the manager. We could also interpret ± as the degree of similarity in the or-
ganizational cultures of the two divisions. When ± is high, it means that the head-o¢ce
faces costly integration, which may be due to the signi…cant di¤erences in organizational
cultures of the two divisions.
The head-o¢ce learns the payo¤s of all possible projects with probability E; and with
probability (1 ¡ E) the head-o¢ce learns nothing. The costs of acquiring information
for the head-o¢ce are
(E)2
2 : For simplicity, the head-o¢ce’s costs of e¤ort are assumed
to be inseparable. Thus, these costs represent the total costs of acquiring information
about the projects’ prospects of the two divisions. This implies that when she is informed
(uninformed) about the projects’ prospects of the …rst division, she will also be informed
(uninformed) about the projects’ prospects of the second division.5 We will later see how
the results change when the head-o¢ce’s costs are separable.
We consider a particular case in which only two projects in each portfolio give non-
negative pro…ts and private bene…ts. Only one of these two gives non zero pro…ts to the
head-o¢ce. Similarly, only one of these two gives non zero private bene…ts to the manager
in charge. With probability ¯ 2 (0;1) the same project is preferred by both, the head-
o¢ce and the manager. Hence, parameter ¯ measures the degree of interest congruence
between the head-o¢ce and the manager. If no project is undertaken, then the ’status quo’
prevails. Pro…ts and private bene…ts are normalized to zero. We allow for the congruence
parameter between the …rst division and the head-o¢ce (¯1) to be di¤erent from the
congruence parameter between the second division and the head-o¢ce (¯2).
The head-o¢ce’s pro…ts in a separated form of internal organization. In this organi-
zational form, divisions cannot realize potential externalities unless there is coordination
5This assumption essentially says that the head-o¢ce has an inferior information acquisition technology
as compared to divisional managers. A divisional manager, if he is appointed to run the integrated
divisions, can have a more precise information acquisition technology. However, we assume that such a
superior technology is costly. This notion is captured by the term ± in the costs of e¤ort function of the
manager. This particular setting will make the trade-o¤ in the model more explicit and will enable us to
draw a sharp conclusion.
8across divisions. However, creating coordination within a separated form of internal orga-
nization is costly. For simplicity, we assume that these costs are prohibitively high. If the











The head-o¢ce’s pro…ts in an integrated form of internal organization. In this organi-
zational form, the two divisions are assigned to a common manager. A better coordination
can be easily created. This coordination enables the head-o¢ce to realize potential ex-
ternalities across divisions. We can think of these externalities as complementary gains
accrued from combining divisions. We denote these gains by parameter ®: We impose the
following assumption on the value of ®:
Assumption 2: The size of ® is equal for both divisions, and for simplicity we assume
that it could take any value between ¡1 < ® < 1.
Positive externalities (® > 0) can be interpreted as a value-enhancing integration (syner-
gistic), while negative externalities (® < 0) can be interpreted as a value-destroying inte-
gration. There will be no externalities when ® = 0. If the preferred projects of the head-
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Note that subscript k indicates the manager who is appointed to manage both divisions in
the integrated form. This manager could be either M1 or M2:
Managers’ private bene…ts in a separated form of internal organization. Each divisional
manager obtains private bene…ts B1i and B2j; if their preferred projects are implemented.
These private bene…ts could be in the forms of job satisfaction, perquisites, etc. Follow-
ing, Aghion and Tirole (1997), we assume that divisional managers are not motivated by
monetary bene…ts and receive their reservation wages which are normalised to zero.6 If in-
stead the preferred projects of the head-o¢ce are implemented, divisional managers obtain
respectively ¯1B1i and ¯2B2j.
Managers’ private bene…ts in an integrated form of internal organization. If the pre-











For simplicity, we impose the following assumption.
6This assumption can be motivated by two reasons. Firstly, if managers are in…nitely risk averse with
respect to income risks, then the head-o¢ce should provide full insurance to managers, and thus should
provide …xed wages which are set as high as managers’ reservation wages. Secondly, in a world of incomplete
contract, a contract specifying a monetary compensation cannot be designed. See also de Bijl (1996) for
a similar analysis.
9Assumption 3: ¦1i = ¦2j and B1i = B2j:
As for the structure of authority, we assume that the head-o¢ce retains formal au-
thority. However, divisional managers may have real authority. Note that this distinction
between formal versus real authority follows that of Aghion and Tirole (1997). Formal au-
thority is de…ned as authority which results from an explicit or implicit contract allocating
the right to decide on speci…c matters. Real authority refers to an e¤ective control over
decisions. Real authority could be the result of a superior possession of information. Man-
agers might have real authority if they are informed, while the head-o¢ce is not. When
this is the case, the head-o¢ce may delegate the decision making authority to managers.7
The timingof the model is depicted in Figure 2. In the …rststage, the head-o¢ce chooses
the …rm’s internal organizational form. Then, in the second stage the head-o¢ce and
managers simultaneously exert e¤ort to acquire information about projects’ payo¤s. In the
third stage, divisional managers convey their information to the head-o¢ce. Subsequently,
if the head-o¢ce is informed about projects’ payo¤s, she will decide which projects should
be implemented by divisional managers. Otherwise if the head-o¢ce is not informed, she
is willing to accept the suggestion of divisional managers. If both the head-o¢ce and
divisional managers are informed, then the head-o¢ce will exercise her formal authority
by overruling managers’ suggestions, and forcing managers to implement her preferred
projects. If both are not informed, then no project is going to be implemented (the status
quo prevails) and pro…ts and private bene…ts are normalized to zero. We assume that the
information conveyed by divisional managers is hard information, in the sense that if it is
communicated by the other party it can be easily and costlessly veri…ed.8 In the last stage
payo¤s and private bene…ts are realized.
Figure 2: The Time Frame
We will now write the expressions of the payo¤s of the head-o¢ce and divisional man-
agers in both divisional structures.
7The head-o¢ce will be better-o¤ following managers’ suggestions because doing so yields positive
payo¤s, except of course when the interests of the principal and divisional managers are diametrically
opposed. If the head-o¢ce opts for the ’status-quo’ project, that is by refusing to follow managers’
suggestion, she gets zero.
8See Aghion and Tirole (1997) for the concept of hard and soft information.
102.1 Separated Form of Internal Organization
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In which superscript ’sp’ denotes the separated form. Note that, by assumption 3, we
have that ¦1i = ¦2j. Since they are the same, throughout this paper we will just supress
the subscripts. The …rst part represents the head-o¢ce’s payo¤s when she is informed
(with probability Esp) and asks the two divisional managers to implement her preferred
projects. With probability (1 ¡ Esp) she is not informed, and she is willing to accept the





2 : The head-o¢ce’s payo¤s are then discounted by, respectively ¯1
and ¯2, the degree of interest congruence between her and divisional managers.




























Similarly because B1i = B2j; throughout this paper we supress the subscripts. When
the head-o¢ce is informed, each manager will have to implement the preferred project of
the head-o¢ce. Managers receive private bene…ts which are discounted by, respectively ¯1
and ¯2: However, when the head-o¢ce is not informed but managers are, then managers
get their highest private bene…ts.
2.2 Integrated Form of Internal Organization
In an integrated form of internal organization, there is a common manager in charge of the
two divisions. We use superscript ’in’ to denote the integrated form. In a similar fashion
as the previous case, we can express the payo¤s of the head-o¢ce as,
U
in
h = 2(1 + ®)E















with subscript k indicates the manager who is appointed to manage the integrated divisions.
This manager could either be M1 or M2. We assume that they are equally probable to be
appointed. Thus, ein
k1 and ein
k2 indicate the exerted e¤ort levels of the appointed manager
11k on respectively the …rst division and the second division. Note that, as is mentioned
before, ® denotes complementary gains accrued from integration.





























In an integrated form, since one of the two managers will be appointed, hence there will
be three possible congruence parameter con…gurations, i.e. ¯k = ¯1 6= ¯2, or ¯k 6= ¯1 = ¯2,
or ¯k = ¯1 = ¯2.
3 The Optimal E¤ort Levels of the Head-o¢ce and
Manager(s)
We start with the case of separated form of internal organization. Taking the FOCs of
expressions (1), (2), and (3) gives,
E
sp = 2¦ ¡ (e
sp
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sp)B (8)
Solving simultaneously the system of equations (6), (7), and (8) yields,
E
sp =
2¦ ¡ ¦B (¯1 + ¯2)






















2 ; and Esp are probabilities, their values should be between (0;1). Using





2 ;Esp 2 (0;1) for all admissible values of ¯1 and ¯2, if 0 < ¦ 6 1
2; and
0 < B 6 1
2:
12Proof. From the model setting, we know that ¦ > 0; B > 0; and ¯1,¯2 2 (0;1]: Manip-
ulating expression (9) to have 0 6 Esp 6 1; we obtain, 0 < ¦ 6 1
2 and 0 < B 6 2
(¯1+¯2):




2 6 1; we obtain
0 < B 6 1
1¡(2¡(¯1+¯2))¦, 0 < ¦ 6 1
1¡(2¡(¯1+¯2))B; ¦ 6 1
2; and B > 0: Combining all of this
information, we can straightforwardly derive Lemma 1.
Note that Lemma 1 does not imply that the values of ¦ and B cannot be bigger than
1
2. For some values of ¯, we can still have ¦;B > 1
2 without violating e;E 2 (0;1): Since
we are interested in knowing the e¤ect of varying ¯ on e¤ort levels and the head-o¢ce’s
payo¤s, there is no loss of generality if we consider only the values of ¦ and B which are
valid for all admissible values of ¯:
Using expressions (6) - (11) we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1: In a separated form of internal organization;
(i) E¤ort levels of the head-o¢ce and divisional managers are strategic substitutes.
(ii) An increase in e¤ort levels of a divisional manager has no direct e¤ect on e¤ort
levels of the other divisional manager. However, there is a positive indirect
e¤ect.
(iii) E¤ort levels of the head-o¢ce are decreasing in the degree of interests congruence
between the head-o¢ce and a divisonal manager. E¤ort levels of the manager
will increase due to the strategic substitutability.
(iv) E¤ort levels of a divisional manager is increasing in the degree of interests con-
gruence between the head-o¢ce and his fellow manager.
(v) E¤ort levels of the head o¢ce are increasing in the payo¤s that can be generated
by a division. Similarly, e¤ort levels of a divisonal manager are increasing in
the size of his private bene…ts.
Proof. See appendix.
Point (i) tells that when the head-o¢ce intensi…es her monitoring e¤orts, divisional
managers will exert lower e¤ort levels. Monitoring has an adverse e¤ect on managerial
initiatives.
Point (ii) shows that an increase in e¤ort levels of a manager will only have an indirect
e¤ect on e¤ort levels of the other manager. This is because when a manager increases
his e¤ort levels, the head-o¢ce will monitor less. This will increase the other manager’s

































This result is driven by the inferiority of the head-o¢ce’s monitoring technology. If the
head-o¢ce has a more precise technology, in the sense that, her monitoring costs are sep-
arable, then this indirect e¤ect will be absent.
Point (iii) tells that when the interests of the head-o¢ce and a divisional manager
becomes more alligned, then the head-o¢ce will reduce her monitoring intensity. Due to
the costs inseparability, a decrease in the head-o¢ce’s monitoring-e¤ort levels will bene…t
the other manager too (point (iv)). Thus, basically there is a spillover-e¤ect operating.
Suppose that the degree of interests congruence of divisional managers are such that ¯1 >
¯2, and for an exogeneous reason ¯1 increases. Then, the second manager with a lower
degree of interest congruence (¯2) could take advantage of this situation. We know that
if ¯1 increases, the head-o¢ce’s monitoring-e¤ort levels will decrease. This is of course
bene…cial for the second manager, as he will then also face a less stringent monitoring.
Finally, point (v) is intuitive. The bigger the size of the pie, the higher the incentive
to exert e¤ort.
We now proceed with the case of integrated form of internal organization. Taking the
FOCs of expressions (4) and (5) gives,
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We solve the optimal e¤ort levels in two steps. In the …rst step we solve the manager’s
e¤ort allocation problem. The manager who is in charge of the two divisions will have to
decide how to allocate his e¤ort on both divisions. In the second step, we then solve for



















Substituting the above results into (13) we obtain,
14E
in =
2¦(1 + ®)[(1 + ±) ¡ ¯kB]
(1 + ±) ¡ 2¯k¦B (1 + ®)
(18)





1 ¡ 2¦(1 + ®)







1 ¡ 2¦(1 + ®)
(1 + ±) ¡ 2¯kB¦(1 + ®)
¶
B (20)
The following lemma applies,
Lemma 2: ein
k1;ein
k2;Ein 2 ((0;1) for all admissible values of ®;¯k; and ±, if 0 < ¦ 6 1
4;
and 0 < B 6 1:
Proof. From the model setting we know that ¦ > 0; B > 0; ¡1 6 ® 6 1; 0 6 ± 6 1; and




¯k . Next, using expression (19) to check for 0 6 ein
k1 6 1 and 0 6 ein
k2 6 1;yields
0 6 B 6 1
1¡(2¡(¯1+¯2))¦; 0 6 ¦ 6 1
1¡(2¡(¯1+¯2))B; ¦ 6 1
2; and B > 0. It is then easy to
check that Lemma 2 holds.








k2;Esp;Ein 2 (0;1) for all admissible values of ®;¯1;¯2;¯k; and
±, if 0 < ¦ 6 1
4; and 0 < B 6 1
2:
Using expressions (13)-(19), we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2: In an integrated form of internal organization;
(i) E¤ort levels of the head-o¢ce and the manager are strategic substitutes.
(ii) An increase in the manager’s e¤ort levels exerted on a division has an ambiguous
e¤ect on his e¤ort levels exerted on the other division.
(iii) E¤ort levels of the head-o¢ce are decreasing in the degree of interests congruence
between the head-o¢ce and the manager.
(iv) E¤ort levels of the head-o¢ce are increasing in the size of the complementary
gains (®) accruing from integration. E¤ort levels of the manager will decrease
due to the strategic substitutability.
15(v) E¤ort levels of the manager are decreasing in the degree of costs substitution
(±). Monitoring e¤ort levels of the head-o¢ce will increase due to the strategic
substitutability.
(vi) E¤ort levels of the head o¢ce are increasing in the payo¤s that can be generated
by a division. Similarly, e¤ort levels of the manager are increasing in the size
of his private bene…ts.
Proof. See appendix.
Point (i), (iii), and (vi) in the above proposition are the same as point (i), (iii), and
(v) in the previous proposition.
Point (ii) is obtained because there are two opposing e¤ects of a change in ein
k1 (or ein
k2):
On the one hand, an increase in ein
k1 (ein
k2) will decrease ein
k2 (ein
k1) due to the subsititutability
of the costs of e¤ort. On the other hand, it will decrease Ein; which in turn will raise ein
k2
(ein


























The net e¤ect is unclear. It depends on the degree of costs of e¤ort substitution ±: If










> 0: This means that
the appointed manager might still be willing to increase e¤ort on another division despite
the presence of costs of e¤ort substitution if the degree of substitution is su¢ciently low.
Otherwise, if the degree of substitution is too high, it might be optimal for the manager to
concentrate only on a division and spend no e¤ort on the other division.
A higher ® (complementary gains) implies that the head-o¢ce’s payo¤s will be higher
when the head-o¢ce is informed, but on the other hand she will have to forego a higher
share of her payo¤s when she is not informed. The …rst e¤ect dominates the second e¤ect.
Because of strategic subsitutability in e¤ort levels, the manager will then be less willing to
exert e¤ort.
An increase in the degree of substitution (±) in the manager’ cost function implies that
a higher e¤ort spent on a division will further increase marginal costs of increasing e¤ort
on another division. Thus, the manager faces increasingly high coordination costs. As a
result, a higher ± creates a dis-incentive for the appointed manager to exert e¤ort on the
two divisions.
164 Comparing Managerial E¤ort Levels
Suppose that manager 1 is the appointed manager in an integrated form, then we have
¯k = ¯1:9 We will now compare the optimal e¤ort levels that manager 1 will exert on
division 1 in an integrated structure (ein
k1) with the optimal e¤ort levels that he will exert
on division 1 if instead the …rm adopt a separated structure (e
sp




k1 we obtain the following,
¢e
¤ =
1 ¡ 2(1 + ®)B¦
(1 + ±) ¡ 2(1 + ®)¯1B¦
¡
(1 ¡ 2¦)B
1 ¡ (¯1 + ¯2)B¦
(22)




Suppose that integration does not bring complementary gains (® = 0) and there are no










1 ¡ (¯1 + ¯2)B¦
¶
(23)
We observe that ¢e¤ = 0 prevails only if managers are symmetric in their degree of interests
congruence (¯1 = ¯2). While if they are not, and ¯1 < ¯2 (¯1 > ¯2); we have ¢e¤ < 0
(¢e¤ > 0). Thus, we can establish that,
Proposition 3: Suppose ® = 0 and ± = 0;
(i) If ¯1 = ¯2; then the manager will be indi¤erent between the two internal organi-
zational forms.
(ii) If ¯1 6= ¯2; then holding ¯2 constant, ¢e¤ is increasing in ¯1: This implies that
the manager will not be indi¤erent anymore.
Proof. It is straighforward from expression (23).
This implies that even if there are no complementary gains and costs interdependence,
there might still be di¤erences in the equilibrium e¤ort levels exerted by the manager in
the two di¤erent organizational structures, unless when ¯1 = ¯2: It depends crucially on
the relative degree of interests congruence (¯1 vis-à-vis ¯2).
This result can be explained as follows. In a separated form, the manager can take
advantage from a high degree of interest congruence between the head-o¢ce and his fellow
manager, eventhough his interests might not be well-alligned to those of the head-o¢ce (his
9We have the mirror image of this case when the appointed manager is manager 2.
17own ¯ is low). A high degree of interest congruence induces less monitoring by the head-
o¢ce. Since by construction, the head-o¢ce’s monitoring costs are inseparable, it implies
that the manager will enjoy less monitoring as well. This is a kind of positive spillovers
enjoyed by a manager in a separated form of internal organization. Thus, a manager with
a low ¯ will be more willing to exert e¤ort in a separated form of internal organization
than in an integrated form.
Now, suppose that ® 6= 0 and ± 6= 0. We know that ® and ± in‡uence ¢e¤ through ein
k1
only. Proposition 2 shows that
@ein
k1
@® < 0 and
@ein
k1
@± < 0: Thus, ¢e¤ is decreasing in ® and ±.








To have a more comprehensive view on the relationship between, on the one hand,
synergy (coordination) gains (®);the degree of cost substitution (coordination costs) (±)
and the degree of interests congruence (¯) and, on the other hand, managerial e¤ort levels
(ein and esp) we carry out numerical examples. We …x some parameter values. Lemma 3
tells us that the valid range of ¦ and B for all admissible values of ¯ are 0 6 ¦ 6 1
4 and
0 6 B 6 1
2: Thus, let us …x ¦ = 1
4 and B = 1
2; and consider di¤erent values of ¯ within
the admissible range (0 6 ¯ 6 1).
If managers are symmetric in their degree of interests congruence (¯1 = ¯2), it implies
that there will be no positive spillovers on the other manager resulting from a high degree
of interests congruence of a manager. If instead managers are asymmetric (¯1 6= ¯2), then
the relative size of ¯1 to ¯2 will in‡uence managerial e¤ort levels. We will, therefore,
perform two numerical examples, the …rst one is for the case of ¯1= ¯2, and the second
one is for the case of ¯16= ¯2. If ¯1 = ¯2 occurs; then it does not really matter which
manager should be appointed to run the integrated organizational form because they are
identical. This is not the case when ¯1 6= ¯2.
Plugging the values for ¦; B, ¯1, and ¯2 into (22) we obtain ¢e¤ as a function of ® and
±. We depict the level curves of ¢e¤ at ¢e¤ = 0 for di¤erent values of ¯1 and ¯2: These
curves thus represent ’iso-e¤ort levels’ curves showing combinations of ® and ± which
give the same value of managerial e¤ort in di¤erent internal organization forms (¢e¤ = 0).
If Managers are Symmetric (¯1 = ¯2)
Figure 3 below depicts the ’iso e¤ort-levels’ curves at ¢e¤ = 0.
18Figure 3: Managerial E¤ort Levels (¯1 = ¯2; ¦ = 0:25; B = 0:5)
The lower curve is valid for ¯1 = ¯2 = 1; while the upper curve is valid for ¯1 = ¯2 = 0.
The dashed lines indicate that for all combinations of ® and ± lying on the left-hand side
(right-hand side) of the level curves we have ¢e¤ > 0 (¢e¤ < 0). We can then establish
the following results.
Proposition 4: If the two managers’ interests are equally alligned to the head-o¢ce’s
interests (¯1 = ¯2), then it is the case that,
(i) If ® > 0 prevails; then managers will always exert lower e¤ort levels in an integrated
form of internal organization (¢e¤ < 0).
(ii) If ® < 0 prevails; then managers might or might not exert lower e¤ort levels in an
integrated form of internal organization, depending on the relative size of ® and ±.
(iii) If ® < 0 prevails and ¯
0s are increasing (approaching the lower ’iso e¤ort-levels’
curve of Figure 3), then a separated form will become increasingly attractive for the
manager. If ¯
0s are decreasing (approaching the upper ’iso e¤ort-levels’ curve of
Figure 3), then an integrated form will become increasingly attractive for managers:
This result can be explained intuitively as follows. In an integrated form, a higher and
positive ® will be bene…cial for the head-o¢ce because it re‡ects synergy gains accruing
from a better coordination between the two complementary divisions. Thus, it induces the
head-o¢ce to monitor more. Unfortunately, it will not motivate the appointed manager
19to work hard. Furthermore, when ± is also positive; it will even be worse for the manager.
As a result, the appointed manager will exert lower e¤ort in an integrated form.
A negative ®; on the other hand, will not be preferred by the head-o¢ce, because this
means that integration creates negative externalities. The appointed manager, however,
will be bene…tted, because a negative ® lowers the head-o¢ce’s incentive to monitor. This
will motivate the manager to exert higher e¤ort levels in an integrated form, unless ± is
su¢ciently high.
Another interesting result is that, a higher value of the degree of interests congruence
(¯) makes a separated form more attractive for managers. We know that a higher value of
¯ implies a larger utility for managers, and thus will motivate managers to work harder.
However, the e¤ect of a higher ¯ on the managerial e¤ort di¤ers in size for di¤erent
organizational forms. In an integrated form, the e¤ect of ¯ will be smaller because there
is a countervailing e¤ect arising from a positive degree of costs of e¤ort substitution (±).
In a separated form, this countervailing e¤ect does not exist. Consequently, if we have
j®j < ±, then a manager will tend to exert higher e¤ort levels in a separated form than in
an integrated form. When ¯ increases, a separated form will become more attractive for
managers, unless of course when j®j > ±.
If Managers are Asymmetric (¯1 6= ¯2)
Next, we will do the same analysis for the case of ¯1 6= ¯2. Figure 4 below illustrates
the results of the numerical examples. The lower level curve is valid for ¯1 = 0 and ¯2 = 1;
while the upper level curve is valid for ¯1 = 1 and ¯2 = 0. As in the previous case, we
have ¢e¤ > 0 and ¢e¤ < 0 in, respectively, the left-hand side area and the right hand side
area of the level curves.
20Figure 4: Managerial E¤ort Levels (¯1 6= ¯2, ¦ = 0:25, B = 0:5)
We obtain the following results,
Proposition 5: If the two managers’ interests are not equally alligned to the head-o¢ce’s
interests (¯1 6= ¯2), then it is the case that,
(i) If ® > 0, ± > 0; and ¯1 < ¯2 prevail, then managers will always exert lower e¤ort
levels in an integrated form of internal organization (¢e¤ < 0).
(ii) If ¯1 is increasing such that ¯1 > ¯2; then we may have either ¢e¤ < 0 or ¢e¤ > 0;
depending on the size of ® and ±.
(a) For ® > 0; we have ¢e¤ < 0 if ® and ± are big enough, otherwise ¢e¤ > 0.
(b) For ® < 0; we have ¢e¤ > 0; unless ± is su¢ciently high:
If ¯1 6= ¯2 prevails, then the relative size of ¯ will in‡uence the managerial e¤ort. As is
mentioned before, a manager with a lower ¯ in a separated form obtains a windfall bene…t
from the fact that the second manager has a higher ¯: A higher ¯ induces less monitoring,
which is good for managers. Consequently, if ¯ of a manager increases, then an integrated
form will become increasingly attractive for a manager with a high value of ¯ relative to
the other manager, but not for a manager with a low value of ¯: The manager with a low
value of ¯ would prefer to have a separated form of organization, because he can free-ride
on the high value of ¯ of his fellow manager.
Also, a manager with a very high value of ¯ relative to the other manager will be more
willing to tolerate a small adverse e¤ect of positive synergy gains (® > 0) and a su¢ciently
small degree of costs of e¤ort substitution on his incentive to exert e¤ort.10 The positive
e¤ect of a high value of ¯ relative to the other manager will be su¢cient enough to o¤set
the negative e¤ect of small and positive values of ® and ±.
Note that if the appointed manager is a manager with a low value of ¯ relative to the
other manager, then he will only be willing to exert higher e¤ort in an integrated form if
® < 0 (j®j is su¢ciently big) or if ± is su¢ciently low.
If the head-o¢ce decides to adopt an integrated form of internal organization, then a
manager with a high degree of interests congruence, or a manager who shares more or less
a similar organizational value with the head-o¢ce will be appointed by the head-o¢ce (see
also Enz, 1988).
10With a su¢ciently small ±, the manager will still increase his e¤ort levels exerted on both divisions if
¯ increases. This is shown in the comparative statics results in Table 2 in appendix
215 The Payo¤s of the Head-O¢ce
Suppose that ® = 0 and ± = 0; then if ¯1 = ¯2 prevails, there will be no di¤erence between
internal organizational forms. However, if ¯1 6= ¯2 prevails, then the head-o¢ce will not be
indi¤erent anymore. Her payo¤s obtained from managing an internal organizational form
will depend on the relative degree of interests congruence.
Now, let us allow for ® > 0 and ± > 0: We again perform two numerical examples. The
…rst one is for the case of symmetric managers (¯1 = ¯2) and the second one is for the
case of asymmetric managers (¯1 6= ¯2). We use the same parameter values as before, and




as a function of ® and ±: Let us denote (Uin
h ¡ U
sp
h ) as ¢U¤: We will use ¢U¤ = 0 as the
benchmark, and then show the level curves of ¢U¤. These plots represent ’iso-payo¤s’
curves for the head-o¢ce.
If Managers are Symmetric (¯1 = ¯2)
Figure 5 below depicts the ’iso-payo¤s’ curves at ¢U¤ = 0. Note that when ¯ increases
then the ’iso-payo¤s’ curve will shift right-ward.
Figure 5: The Payo¤s of the Head-o¢ce (¯1 = ¯2; ¦ = 0:25; B = 0:5)
We can establish the following result.
Proposition 6: If the two managers’ interests are equally alligned to the head-o¢ce’s
interests (¯1 = ¯2), then it is the case that,
22(i) If ® < 0 prevails, then the head-o¢ce will always prefer a separated form to an
integrated form of internal organization.
(ii) If ® > 0 prevails, then the head-o¢ce’s incentive to integrate divisions will
be increasing, unless the degree of costs of e¤ort substitution (±) is su¢ciently
high. In order to keep integration remains attractive for the head-o¢ce, ® has
to be su¢ciently high.
(iii) If ¯
0s are increasing, then a separated form of internal organization will be
increasingly preferred to an integrated form of internal organization.
The area to the left of the iso-payo¤s curves represents the case of ¢U¤ < 0; and the
area to the right of the iso-payo¤s curves represents the case of ¢U¤ > 0. In general, if
integration does not bring complementary gains (® < 0), there will be no incentive for the
head-o¢ce to integrate the two divisions.
If ± is su¢ciently large, an integration becomes less attractive if the gains from inte-
gration (®) are relatively low. A manager in an integrated form of internal organization
will be confronted with a certain degree of costs of e¤ort substitution (±), while a manager
in a separated form will not be. A positive ± creates a dis-incentive to exert e¤ort for a
manager in an integrated form.
If ¯
0s are increasing, managers will be motivated to exert higher e¤ort levels (see propo-
sitions 1 and 2). However, due to the presence of parameter ± in an integrated form, the
e¤ect of increasing ¯
0s on the managerial e¤ort will be more pronounced in a separated
form than in an integrated form. Thus, in order to take advantage of increasing ¯
0s, it will
be better for the head-o¢ce to choose a separated form:
If ± becomes higher, a separated form will become more attractive, unless of course if
® is very high. It is obvious that when we have ± = 0 and ® > 0, an integrated form will
always be preferred by the head-o¢ce.
If Managers are Asymmetric (¯1 6= ¯2)
Figure 6 below depicts the case of ¯1 6= ¯2
23Figure 6: The Payo¤s of the Head-o¢ce (¯1 6= ¯2; ¦ = 0:25; B = 0:5)
We can establish the following result.
Proposition 7: If the two managers’ interests are not equally alligned to the head-o¢ce’s
interests (¯1 6= ¯2), then it is the case that,
(i) If ® > 0 (® < 0) prevails, then in general the head-o¢ce would like to integrate
(to separate) the two divisions: However, there might still be some exceptions
depending on the relative size of ¯
0s: If ¯1 > ¯2 (¯1 < ¯2) and the relative
di¤erence is big, an integrated (a separated) form can still dominate a separated
form even if ® < 0 (® > 0).
Thus, in general a decision to integrate divisions will be in‡uenced by the size of synergy
gains. However, it does not mean that when ® > 0 it is always better to integrate, or when
® < 0 it is always better to separate divisions. It also depends on the size of ¯: When
the appointed manager in an integrated form and the head-o¢ce have alligned interests, it
could still be pro…table to integrate eventhough ® < 0: The bene…t of the alligned interests
will be su¢cient enough to outweigh the small costs of integration (® < 0). Of course this
will not happen if ± is high, as the manager will then be less interested in exerting higher
e¤ort.
On the other hand, if the appointed manager has a much lower ¯ than the other
manager, then in general an integration will be less preferred by the head-o¢ce. This is
because this manager will work less hard in an integrated form (see result 2), it is better
24for him to be in a separated form and enjoy the spillover bene…ts of a higher ¯ of his
fellow manager. The adverse e¤ect of a low ¯ on the exerted e¤ort in an integrated form
makes an integration less attractive for the head-o¢ce, unless the bene…ts of integration
(®) are su¢ciently high to outweigh this adverse e¤ect. This, of course, implies that if the
head-o¢ce decides to integrate divisions, she will pick a manager with the highest degree
of interests congruence.
6 The Choice of Internal Organization
If ® = 0; ± = 0; and ¯1 = ¯2; then the head-o¢ce will be indi¤erent between the two
internal organizational forms. Integration and separation will give the same payo¤s for the
head-o¢ce. If ¯1 6= ¯2; then the head-o¢ce will not be indi¤erent anymore between the
two forms.
If instead ® 6= 0 and ± 6= 0 prevail. Higher gains (®) are good for the head-o¢ce.
However, in our model higher gains also induces the head-o¢ce to monitor more, which
will make a manager in an integrated form reluctant to work hard. This is bad for the
head-o¢ce. Yet, if the bene…ts of integration are still su¢ciently high to o¤set this adverse
e¤ect, the head-o¢ce might still prefer an integrated form to a separated form.
If Managers are Symmetric (¯1 = ¯2)
Figure 7 below depicts the choice of.internal organization when ¯1 = ¯2.
Figure 7: The Choice of Internal Organization (¯1 = ¯2; ¦ = 0:25, B = 0:5)
From our previous discussion we know that, a high ¯ will be more preferred by a
manager in a separated form. In addition, we also know that a high ± will not be preferred
25by a manager in an integrated form. Thus when ¯ and ± are high, we have downward
pressures on the managerial e¤ort. If ® is not high enough to outweigh the downward
pressures, then it is better for the head-o¢ce to separate the two divisions.
We see that if ®, ±, and ¯ are such that we are in region III of the above graph, we have
a con‡icting situation. The head-o¢ce would like to have an integration, but an integrated
form will not induce high managerial e¤ort. Yet, an integration is still preferred by the
head-o¢ce. If we are in region II, the head-o¢ce prefers to have a separated form, and
this form of organization will also motivate the managers to work hard. Region II becomes
smaller when ¯ decreases. Finally, if we are in region I, there will be again a con‡icting
case. The manager will work harder only in an integrated form. However, the head-o¢ce
prefers to sacri…ce e¤ort inducement and choose to separate divisions.
If Managers are Asymmetric (¯1 6= ¯2)
Figure 8: The Choice of Internal Organization (¯1 6= ¯2; ¦ = 0:25, B = 0:5)
The graph can be explained as follows. In region I, the head-o¢ce prefers to have a
separated form eventhough it does not motivate managers to work hard. In region II, the
head-o¢ce still prefers a separated form, and now managers will be motivated to work
hard in a separated form. In region III, the head-o¢ce will choose an integrated form,
eventhough this organizational form is not conducive for the alleviation of managerial
e¤ort. In region IV the head-o¢ce will adopt an integrated form of internal organization.
Manager 1 will also work harder in this internal organizational form.
If ¯1 < ¯2, then the left-hand side curve will shift leftward, and the right-hand side curve
will shift rightward. As a result region II becomes bigger, and region IV may disappear if
26¯1 is small relative to ¯2. The opposite happens when ¯1 is high relative to ¯2. Figure 8
shows the highest possible ¯1 relative to ¯2. The more congruent the interests of manager
1 is, the more attractive an integrated form will be for the head-o¢ce.
An integrated form will also become more attractive for the head-o¢ce when ® is
positive and large. However, there is an adverse e¤ect of a positive value of ® on the
managerial e¤ort.
Note that if ¯1 > ¯2, and ¯1 is relatively high compared to ¯2, then the head-o¢ce
might still be willing to tolerate an integration with negative externalities (® < 0), in order
to take advantage of the higher value of ¯: On the contrary, if ¯1 < ¯2 and ¯1 is relatively
small compared to ¯2 then an integrated form will not be chosen, unless ® is positive and
large.
Summary:
We can summarize our results for both cases (¯1 = ¯2 and ¯1 6= ¯2) in the following
proposition.
Proposition 9: The optimal choice of internal organization is determined by the trade-o¤
between the bene…ts of integration and the managerial e¤ort elicitation. In addition
we …nd that;
(i) If ¯1 = ¯2 (no spillover-e¤ect); then the lower the value of ¯
0s are, the more
attractive integration will become.
(ii) If ¯1 6= ¯2 (there is a spillover-e¤ect); then the higher the asymmetry in terms
of degree of interest congruence between the two managers is, the more attractive
integration will become.
(iii) If integration is optimal, the head-o¢ce will pick a manager with the highest
degree of interests congruence to run an integrated form of internal organization.
(iv) Integration (separation) of divisions can be used as a commitment device by the
head-o¢ce. For instance, by tolerating a ’non-synergistic’ integration, provided
that the head-o¢ce’s losses are not too big, the head-o¢ce can commit not to
intensely monitor managers.
7 An Extension: The Separability of the Head-o¢ce’s
Monitoring Costs
If we assume that the head-o¢ce is able to separate the monitoring costs, then expression
(6) and (13) will become simpler,
27E
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With straightforward manipulations we can compare managerial e¤ort in a separated







B (1 ¡ ¦(1 + ®))
(1 + ±) ¡ ¯1B¦(1 + ®)
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(1 ¡ ¯1B¦)




B (1 ¡ ¦)
1 ¡ ¯1B¦
¡
B (1 ¡ ¦)
1 ¡ ¯1B¦
It is obvious that the relative size of ¯
0s does not matter. Actually, the case of separability
of the head-o¢ce’s monitoring costs is analytically equivalent to the case of equal ¯
0s for the
two managers when monitoring costs are inseparable. Thus, the separability of monitoring
costs implies that the relative degree of interest congruence does not matter. Hence, we
have analogous results as in proposition 4.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study the design of a …rm’s internal organization. We consider a …rm
consisting of a head-o¢ce, two divisions, and two managers. The head-o¢ce can integrate
28the two divisions and appoint one manager to run the integrated-divisions. Alternatively,
the head-o¢ce can separate the two divisions and appoint a manager to run each division.
In our model, The head-o¢ce has formal authority over the choice of projects to be im-
plemented. However, the head-o¢ce is willing to delegate the decision making authority to
divisional managers whenever divisional managers are better informed about the projects’
prospects. In this case divisional managers have real authority.
We show that the head-o¢ce’s optimal choice of internal organization depends on the
trade-o¤ between synergy gains of integration and the elicitation of managerial e¤ort. This
trade-o¤ occurs because the head-o¢ce concerns more about the …rm’s total payo¤s, while
the managers concern more about their own private bene…ts. Their interests are not
necessarily alligned.
The …rm’s total payo¤s are likely to increase when coordination between divisions can
be created. One way of creating and sustaining coordination is by integrating divisions
under a common manager. If the potential coordination bene…ts are large, an integrated
form of internal organization will become appealing for the head-o¢ce. The head-o¢ce
will also be more motivated to monitor managers when coordination bene…ts are large.
However, there is an adverse e¤ect of monitoring. Managers will have less incentives to
take initiatives and to exert e¤ort because it is more likely that they will be overruled
by the head-o¢ce. On the contrary, when integration does not bring signi…cant bene…ts,
there will be less interests for the head-o¢ce to monitor.11 It will motivate managers to
exert higher e¤ort, because their chance of getting their own way without being overruled
is higher. As a matter of fact, by tolerating a ’not-pro…table’ integration’, provided that the
head-o¢ce’s losses are not too big, the head-o¢ce can commit not to intensely monitor the
managers. This might be useful to induce managers to exert higher e¤ort in an integrated
form of internal organization. Higher managerial e¤ort and smaller monitoring e¤ort are
expected to outweigh the losses due to the value-destroying integration.
We also show that when manager 1 has a high ¯ relative to manager 2; he might still
be willing to tolerate a small positive ®;eventhough it induces a more intense head-o¢ce
monitoring. This is because the high ¯ implies that the manager will still be able to obtain
big private bene…ts from the preferred project of the headquarter. Thus, being overruled
does not make that much di¤erent from not being overruled.
Managerial e¤ort levels are also determined by the degree of costs of e¤ort substitution.
The costs of e¤ort substitution represents coordination costs that have to be incurred by
a manager in an integrated form of organization. These coordination costs could be the
result of the di¤erences in organizational cultures of the divisions or managers’ limited
11Of course given that the integration is not bene…cial, the head-o¢ce might not choose to integrate
divisions if the negative externalities are too big.
29time and ability. For instance, a manager might be more able to handle a certain kind of
job and not the other. Consequently, when he has to focus on two jobs there may be a
trade-o¤. If he spends more time and e¤ort on the job that he knows well, he will have to
put less attention on the second job. Given that he is not that familiar with the second job,
it becomes then costlier for him to handle this job because he has to put more attention
and time when both his ability and time are limited.
Finally, managerial e¤ort levels are also in‡uenced by the degree of interests congruence
between managers and the head-o¢ce. The higher the congruence parameter is, the less
the monitoring e¤ort of the head-o¢ce will be, and thus the more willing the managers
will be to exert e¤ort.
There are two caveats of the paper. The …rst one is that in this paper we assume that a
manager who is appointed to run an integrated form of internal organization is picked from
the existing managers. In the model setting, there are two managers, thus the appointed
manager could be one of them. As a matter of fact, the head-o¢ce can also hire an outsider
to become the manager of the integrated-divisions. To justify our setting, we essentially
assume that the degree of interests congruence (¯) of an outside manager is not known to
the head-o¢ce. This is not the case with inside managers. The head-o¢ce knows exactly
how their interests are alligned. In this kind of setting, it is better for the head-o¢ce to
pick a manager that she knows well to run the integrated-divisions. The second one is that
in the model we assume that formal authority always resides on the hand of the head-o¢ce.
Infact, we can also consider the case where the head-o¢ce delegates formal authority to
divisional managers (see Aghion and Tirole (1997). This paper follows Baker, Gibbons,
and Murphy (1999) in assuming that the head-o¢ce always has formal authority.
Appendix:
Proof of Proposition 1:
It is straightforward to see from expressions (6), (7), and (8) that @Esp
@e
sp




and thus explain point (i) of the proposition.




















































¦B (2¦ ¡ 1)
(¦B (¯1 + ¯2) ¡ 1)
2 (25)
Using Lemma 1 and ignoring the case of ¦ 6 1
2, we can verify that @Esp
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@¯1 > 0. Analogously, we have the
same results for increasing ¯2:
Finally, taking the derivatives of expressions (9) and (10) to check the e¤ect of increasing
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(¦B (¯1 + ¯2) ¡ 1)
2 (29)
Using Lemma 1 and taking ¦ < 1
2 we know that @Esp
































¯1 (¡) (+) (+)
¯2 (¡) (+) (+)
¦ (+) (¡) (¡)
B (¡) (+) (+)
Table 1: Separated Form
Proof of Proposition 2:
It is straightforward to see from expressions (13), (14), and (15) that @Ein
@ein
k1 < 0; @Ein
@ein
k2 < 0;
and thus explain point (i) of the proposition.






























= (1 + ®)¯kB¦ ¡ ± (31)










> 0: The case of an increase in ein
k2 is analogous.
Taking the derivative of expression (18) w.r.t. ® we can analyze the e¤ect of changes




2¦(1 + ± ¡ ¯kB)(1 + ±)
(2¯k¦B (1 + ®) ¡ (1 + ±))
2 (32)
Because the denominator is clearly positive, we just need to check the numerator. To have
a positive sign for the numerator, we need that 1+± > ¯kB: By lemma 3 we know that the
RHS will be smaller than 1; so the above condition will always be satis…ed. This means
that @Ein
@® > 0:
It can be straightforwardly inferred from (19) and (20) that
@ein
k1
@± < 0. By point (i) of
the proposition we know that Ein will increase.
Now we check for the e¤ect of changes in the degree of interest congruence (¯) on the
head-o¢ce’s e¤ort levels, by taking the following derivative.
@Ein
@¯k
= 2¦B (1 + ®)
2¦(1 + ±)(1 + ®) ¡ (1 + ±)
(2¯k¦B (1 + ®) ¡ (1 + ±))
2 (33)
The denominator is clearly positive. The numerator is positive is 2¦(1 + ®) > 1 is satis…ed.
By lemma 3 we know that 2¦ 6 1
2: Hence, for all admissible values of ®; i.e. ¡1 6 ® 6 1,
the above condition will not be satis…ed. Thus, we obtain @Ein
@¯k < 0:
Finally, similar to the case of a specialized form of internal organization, the head-
o¢ce’s and the manager’s e¤ort levels are increasing in own payo¤s and private bene…ts.
This follows from checking the following derivatives,
@Ein
@B
= 2¦(1 + ®)¯k
2¦(1 + ®)(1 + ±) ¡ (1 + ±)




= 2(¯kB ¡ (1 + ±))(1 + ®)
¡(1 + ±)






(1 ¡ 2¦(1 + ®))(1 + ±)





= 2(1 + ®)B
¯kB ¡ (1 + ±)
(2¯k¦B (1 + ®) ¡ (1 + ±))
2 (37)
Using Lemma 3, it can be easily shown that @Ein

















¯k (¡) (+) (+)
® (+) (¡) (¡)
± (+) (¡) (¡)
¦ (+) (¡) (¡)
B (¡) (+) (+)
Table 2: Integrated Form
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